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Abstract I show that quantum theory is the only probabilistic framework that per-
mits arbitrary processes to be emulated by sequences of local measurements. This
supports the view that, contrary to conventional wisdom, measurement should not
be regarded as a complex phenomenon in need of a dynamical explanation but
rather as a primitive – and perhaps the only primitive – operation of the theory.
Keywords foundations of quantum theory · reconstruction · measurement ·
relational theories · nature of time
1 Introduction
Of the various axioms of standard quantum mechanics, the measurement postu-
late marks the most radical departure from classicality. It entails changes of the
quantum state that are discontinuous, in stark contrast to the continuous evolution
of ordinary dynamics; and it raises deep questions – epitomized by the famous
“Schro¨dinger’s cat” [1] and “Wigner’s friend” [2] paradoxes – as to the precise de-
lineation of the border between the quantum and classical realms, between system
and observer, and between microscopic and macroscopic. Its far-reaching concep-
tual implications are captured most beautifully in a metaphor by John Wheeler
[3]:
About the game of twenty questions. You recall how it goes — one of
the after-dinner party sent out of the living room, the others agreeing on a
word, the one fated to be questioner returning and starting his questions.
“Is it a living object?” “No.” “Is it here on earth?” “Yes.” So the questions
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2go from respondent to respondent around the room until at length the word
emerges: victory if in twenty tries or less; otherwise, defeat.
Then comes the moment when we are fourth to be sent from the room. We
are locked out unbelievably long. On finally being readmitted, we find a
smile on everyone’s face, sign of a joke or a plot. We innocently start our
questions. At first the answers come quickly. Then each question begins
to take longer in the answering — strange, when the answer itself is only
a simple “yes” or “no”. At length, feeling hot on the trail, we ask, “Is the
word ‘cloud’?” “Yes”, comes the reply, and everyone bursts out laughing.
When we were out of the room, they explain, they had agreed not to agree
in advance on any word at all. Each one around the circle could respond
“yes” or “no” as he pleased to whatever question we put to him. But how-
ever he replied he had to have a word in mind compatible with his own
reply — and with all the replies that went before. No wonder some of
those decisions between “yes” and “no” proved so hard!
In Wheeler’s game the word does not already exist “out there” — rather, in-
formation about the word is only brought into being through the questions raised.
While the answers given are internally consistent, and eventually converge to some
word, the outcome is influenced by the questioner: A different sequence of ques-
tions will generally lead to a different word. This constitutes a peculiar form of
agent-dependency in that the conclusions drawn depend on the questions asked. It
is distinct from another form of agent-dependency, known from Bayesian proba-
bility theory, where conclusions drawn from experimental data generally depend
on the agent’s prior expectation [4]. While Wheeler’s metaphor should obviously
be taken with a grain of salt, it captures one key aspect of quantum theory: There
is no longer a preexisting reality that is merely revealed, rather than influenced,
by the act of measurement. The image of reality that emerges through acts of
measurement reflects as much the history of intervention as it reflects the external
world [5].
Despite – or perhaps because of – the measurement postulate’s pivotal role in
demarcating the quantum from the classical view of the world many researchers
have shown a strong desire, and deemed it possible, to either dispense with the
measurement process entirely (as in the many-worlds interpretation [6]) or at least
to reduce it to a less intimidating dynamical process, by means of microscopic
collapse models [7] and possibly invoking the aid of some stochastic decoherence-
inducing environment [8]. Yet in my view such attempts are ultimately misguided.
They merely shift the conceptual challenge to a different level; and they avoid a
square confrontation with what is perhaps the core principle of quantum theory,
and with its profound philosophical ramifications.
More recently, alternative views have emerged which suggest that measure-
ment is indeed a primitive process independent of, and possibly even more funda-
mental than, unitary evolution. Quantum Bayesianism [9,10,11], the quantum ver-
sion of the homonymous paradigm in classical probability theory [12,13], views
probabilities – and hence the quantum state – as embodying some agent’s knowl-
edge about, rather than an objective property of, a physical system [14]; so the
discontinuous state change brought about by measurement, other than being some
mysterious “collapse”, is but a Bayesian updating that reflects the agent’s learning
[15]. Within the field of quantum computer science, too, the concept of measure-
3ment is unproblematic and in fact forms the foundation of the entire subject [16].
Moreover, while it has proven difficult – if not outright impossible – to model
the measurement process in terms of unitary evolution (involving modelling of
the measurement apparatus and possibly some stochastic environment) the con-
verse is in fact true: To within any given finite accuracy, every unitary map (in
fact every completely positive map) can be emulated by a sequence of measure-
ments [17]. This is illustrated by the power of measurement-based quantum com-
putation, where arbitrary quantum algorithms can be implemented by sequences
of measurements only; such measurement-based quantum computation is just as
universal as the network model based on unitary gates [18,19]. In short, while it
is not possible to reduce measurement to unitaries, unitaries can certainly be re-
duced to measurement. Relational formulations of quantum theory [20,21,22,23]
and evidence for the possible “timelessness” of quantum gravity [24,25] even sug-
gest that it may in fact be “time” and hence dynamics, rather than measurement,
that should be dispensed with at the most fundamental level.
In this paper I address the question whether the central role of the quantum
measurement process, rather than being a conceptual nuisance in need of expla-
nation, may actually serve as the logical starting point, i.e., constitute the foun-
dational principle for quantum theory. In order to answer the question in the af-
firmative I must show that some small set of assumptions about the measurement
process plus some basic consistency of inferential reasoning will suffice to recover
the full mathematical apparatus – complex Hilbert space – of quantum theory.
Such a reconstruction of quantum theory [26] will be one further proposal in a
long history of different approaches (for a recent overview, see Ref. [27]). Ideally,
it will be of a simplicity and clarity similar to the derivation of the mathematical
apparatus of special relativity – Lorentz transformations – from just the physical
principle that the speed of light be constant in all reference frames [28].
In Section 2 I will propose the central measurement postulate; in Section 3
I will outline the key arguments leading from this postulate to complex Hilbert
space; and in Section 4 I will conclude with some final remarks.
2 Central postulate
Before laying down the central measurement postulate I wish to emphasize that
I view quantum theory first and foremost as a probability theory. Like classical
probability theory it has as its subject propositions (represented by subspaces of
Hilbert space) and their possible logical relations such as implication (embedding)
or mutual exclusion (orthogonality); and its principal raison d’eˆtre is to provide
a set of rules for assigning to these propositions probabilities in a way which
ensures consistency of inferential reasoning. The dynamics of a quantum system
as described by, say, the Schro¨dinger equation is a subsequent add-on and typically
involves the representation of some specific spacetime symmetry group — in the
case of the Schro¨dinger equation, the Galileo group. Here, however, I shall not
regard dynamics but focus exclusively on the probabilistic core.
Underlying quantum theory is a proposition system whose structure is weaker
than that of classical logic in one important respect: In contrast to the latter not
all propositions are jointly decidable; so the Boolean operations “and”, “or” are
no longer defined for arbitrary pairs of propositions but for jointly decidable pairs
4only. As a consequence, the mathematical structure of the proposition system is
no longer that of a distributive lattice [29,30] but, more weakly, an orthomodular
poset or (equivalently) orthoalgebra [31]. It has a well-defined dimension given
by the maximum number of mutually exclusive propositions. I will henceforth
restrict my attention to systems whose dimension is finite.
As for probabilites, these add up whenever two mutually exclusive (and hence
also jointly decidable) propositions are concatenated with a Boolean “or” opera-
tion. The state of a system is tantamount to an exhaustive list of probabilities for
all propositions. Arbitrary convex combination of such probability tables yields
another allowed probability table, as does rescaling with any factor less than one
(states need not be normalised); so states form a convex cone. States may be mixed
(whenever they can be written as a convex combination of other states), or else
pure. Some propositions (corresponding in quantum theory to one-dimensional
subspaces of Hilbert space) are most accurate in the sense that they are not im-
plied by any other proposition. There is a one-to-one map from these most accu-
rate propositions to pure states: Such propositions, if true, encompass the entire
belief structure and hence must correspond to a unique state; this state is neces-
sarily pure.
When updating probabilities after a measurement, consistency of inferential
reasoning dictates that different ways of using the same information lead to the
same conclusions irrespective of the particular path chosen. Like in classical Bayes-
ian probability theory this consistency requirement implies a Bayes rule [32,13],
the latter now being restricted to pairs of propositions that are jointly decidable.
Given maximal prior information, i.e., the truth of some most accurate proposi-
tion about a system, learning subsequently that some further proposition is true
generally entails – in contrast to the classical case – a non-trivial update of knowl-
edge. Unless the two propositions are jointly decidable, the original most accurate
proposition will no longer be true. Yet the updated knowledge continues to be
maximal, so there will be some other most accurate proposition which is true.
Upon composing systems, their dimensions multiply. Concatenating most ac-
curate propositions that pertain to different constituents (and are hence jointly
decidable) with the Boolean “and” operation yields a most accurate proposition
about the whole. Yet conversely, not all most accurate propositions about the
whole need to arise from such a concatenation; there may be entanglement.
Following these preliminaries the central postulate can now be formulated as
follows: Local measurement is the sole fundamental operation. In other words, it
is always possible to emulate arbitrary processes by sequences of local measure-
ments only. This breaks down into two distinct requirements:
(i) Every global process on a composite system results from concerted action of
local processes on its constituents. Concerted action, in this context, means
that local processes may be correlated, i.e., influenced by information ex-
tracted elsewhere and exchanged through classical or quantum channels; yet
beyond such correlations, there are no genuinely “holistic” degrees of freedom
of a global process. This possibility to reduce global to local processes, lately
termed “operation locality” [33], is the counterpart for processes of the pos-
sibility of local tomography for states. The latter features as an axiom (under
various names) in several recent reconstructions of quantum theory [34,35,
36,37]. It is in fact indispensable for the ability to discover physical laws and
5make testable predictions: Only if a theory is locally tomographic do obser-
vational data obtained from a sufficiently large sample allow one to assign a
unique state to an exchangeable sequence, and hence to infer the properties of
a larger system from those of a sample [38,39].
(ii) Locally, for any single constituent of finite size and to within any given finite
accuracy, every process can be emulated by a finite sequence of measurements.
The setups of these measurements need not be deterministic but may be sub-
ject to a probability distribution, and the latter may in turn be conditioned
on the feed forward of preceding measurement outcomes (as is the case in
measurement-based quantum computation [18,19]).
I shall argue that these two requirements uniquely single out quantum theory in
complex Hilbert space.
3 Derivation of complex Hilbert space
The first part of the central postulate immediately implies that if the theory is
described in a Hilbert space, it must be a complex Hilbert space. Let S(d) denote
the minimum number of propositions whose probabilities suffice to specify an
arbitrary, not necessarily normalised mixed state of a d-dimensional system. A
general process – corresponding in the quantum case to a completely positive map
[40] – maps such a fiducial set of S(d) probabilities to S(d) different probabilities,
thereby preserving consistency of inferential reasoning (in particular positivity)
but not necessarily normalisation; it is by necessity linear [35]. Thus the process
itself is characterised by [S(d)]2 real parameters. In order to meet the requirement
of operation locality, this number of parameters must satisfy the multiplication
law
S(dAdB) = S(dA) ·S(dB) . (1)
Of all Hilbert spaces over a skew field (real, complex or quaternionic) only d-
dimensional Hilbert space over the complex numbers with S(d) = d2 satisfies this
constraint. In the following, therefore, it will suffice to show that the theory must
be described in some Hilbert space.
The second part of the central postulate unfolds its power already when applied
to one specific process, namely that of steering a system – without loss – from a
pure state in which some most accurate proposition e0 is true, to another pure state
in which a different most accurate proposition e is true. Such loss-free steering by
means of measurements only is the mirror image of the Zeno effect [41]. Yet in
order for the theory to exhibit the Zeno effect, it must be smooth in the following
double sense:
(i) For any system of finite dimension d (d ≥ 2) the associated set X(d) of most
accurate propositions must be a continuous manifold of non-zero dimension
dimX(d)> 0. This manifold is endowed with a natural metric [42,43]
dist(e, f ) := sup
ρ
|prob(e|ρ)−prob( f |ρ)| , (2)
6compact and connected; and in the special case of a generalised bit (d = 2)
it is isomorphic to the boundary of the convex set of normalised states1 and
thus, moreover, simply connected. (In quantum theory X(2) is isomorphic to
the surface of the Bloch sphere.) This kind of smoothness is assumed, in one
form or another, also in other reconstructions of quantum theory [34,37,44].
(ii) Probabilities that are initially equal to one must not suddenly jump to a lower
value upon an infinitesimal displacement. In mathematical terms, given the
initial e0 ∈ X(d) and any proposition x which in the associated pure state is
true with certainty, prob(x|e0) = 1, the probability of the latter must change in
a continuous fashion:
∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 : prob(x|e)> 1− ε ∀ e ∈ B(e0;δ ) . (3)
Here B(e0;δ ) denotes an open ball in X(d) of radius δ (in the metric defined
above) around e0.
The latter continuity condition implies that the manifold dimension of X(d)
grows linearly with d,
dimX(d) = dimX(2) · (d−1) . (4)
A detailed proof of this dimensional constraint can be found in Ref. [27]; here
I sketch the main idea for the case d = 3. Thanks to continuity, and taking the
proposition x in the continuity condition to be two-dimensional, there exists a
unique pair (e′,y) of mutually exclusive propositions where (i) e′ is most accu-
rate and implies x, whereas (ii) y is two-dimensional and implied by e. The two
most accurate propositions e′,e can thus be regarded as points either on the same
manifold X(3) or on two distinct manifolds X(2) that are associated with reduced
two-dimensional theories in which x or y are given as true, respectively. Specify-
ing e on X(3) is tantamount to specifying first e′ on X(2), and hence y, given x
and then e on X(2) given y; so dimX(3) = 2 ·dimX(2). Iteration of this argument
leads to the formula for arbitrary d.
In a next step one can employ techniques from group theory to demonstrate
that already the above dimensional constraint forces quantum theory to be de-
scribed in a Hilbert space. The proposition system, endowed with the mathemati-
cal structure of an orthomodular poset or orthoalgebra, gives rise to a group G (d)
of automorphisms preserving implication and mutual exclusion. Without loss of
generality one may assume that this group acts transitively on the set of most ac-
curate propositions — if not, the latter can be decomposed into irreducible compo-
nents, each of which is the orbit of some most accurate proposition under action of
the group. The manifold X(d) (or any irreducible component thereof) is therefore
a homogeneous space [45]
X(d)∼ G (d)/[G (d−1)⊗G (1)] , (5)
with the stability group preserving both the given most accurate proposition (of
dimension one) and its orthocomplement of dimension (d − 1). Thanks to the
above isomorphism all constraints on X(d) readily translate into constraints on
1 or a convex subset thereof, in the hypothetical case (not realised in quantum theory) that
the map from most accurate propositions to pure states is not surjective
7G (d); and one can subsequently use well known classification theorems to distill
those groups that are permitted.
To begin with, as X(d) is continuous, G (d) must be a Lie group; and X(d)
being irreducible, compact and (at least for d = 2) simply connected, G (d) must
itself be compact and simple up to factors U(1). Its Lie group dimension must
satisfy
dimX(d) = dimG (d)−dimG (d−1)−dimG (1) (6)
which, together with Eq. (4), implies the quadratic form
dimG (d) = dimX(2) ·d(d−1)/2+dimG (1) ·d . (7)
Consultation of the classification of compact simple Lie groups [45] reveals that
this dimensional constraint restricts G (d) to be one of SO(nd), U(nd) or Sp(nd),
with n being a positive integer. All these possibilities correspond to some Hilbert
space structure over the reals, complex numbers or quaternions, respectively. In
combination with the first part of the central postulate, this uniquely singles out
quantum theory in complex Hilbert space. ⊓⊔
4 Summary
Quantum theory is one of many conceivable alternatives to classical probability
theory as a consistent framework for inferential reasoning. I have argued here
that quantum theory is distinguished from all other alternatives by the primacy of
measurement: It is the only probabilistic theory where sequences of local mea-
surements can emulate arbitrary processes. Conceptually this result suggests that,
at least in the finite-dimensional case considered here, quantum theory is the only
probabilistic theory that can maintain the appearance of time (permitting arbitrary
processes) even when there is no time (dispensing with unitaries at the fundamen-
tal level); and which thus in principle allows for the abolition of time. Developing
this idea further, it appears that a fundamental theory which is strictly relational
(and hence without external time) must necessarily be quantum. As the latter in
turn forces one to abandon the notion of a preexisting reality [5] one may be led
to conclude quite generally that relationalism and realism exclude each other.
It is my hope that the findings of the present paper will be of interest in a
number of different areas. They may provide a basis for novel reconstructions of
quantum theory; they may further underpin efforts to demarcate quantum infor-
mation processing from information processing in other generalized probabilistic
theories; somewhat more speculatively, they might inform future attempts at con-
structing a strictly relational – and possibly measurement-based – theory of quan-
tum gravity; and finally, they may add a new perspective to the ongoing scientific
and philosophical debate about the nature of time and change [46,47,48].
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